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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST: THE CASE STUDY OF ASYLUM, 
MIGRATION, AND NATIONAL BORDER 
PROTECTION 
FR. FRANK BRENNAN S.J.* 
Abstract: Since World War II, Australia has been the destination of hun-
dreds of thousands of migrants from countries all over the world. Through-
out this time, the government has engaged in different policies of border 
monitoring, protection, and enforcement. This Essay contends that the gov-
ernment should not waiver in its enforcement of its border, and it should 
continue to prevent the illegal entry of migrants into Australia. It, however, 
must do so fairly and compassionately in order to ensure that it protects the 
human rights of migrants. This argument is supported by the fact that the 
current international legal order doesn’t provide any further obligations on 
the state to migrants. Asylum seekers, however, have distinct legal rights 
from migrants, but distinguishing asylum seekers from migrants is not easy 
because no bright line exists. By examining the policies of the United 
States and the European Union while considering the religious discourse of 
refugees, this Essay concludes that Australia must reexamine its current ap-
proach to stopping the boats. 
INTRODUCTION 
On my way to Boston, I spent a week in August 2014 on the U.S.-Mexico 
border visiting the Kino Border Initiative at Nogales (KBI). I visited the spot at 
the border fence where Cardinal Seán Patrick O’Malley, the Archbishop of 
Boston, celebrated mass, reaching through the steel girders to give communion 
to persons on the other side of the border. I heard some of the stories about the 
desperate attempts of border crossers, many of whom were children fleeing 
impossibly lawless situations back home heading for the safety of their dreams 
with relatives already resident in the United States. Fr. Sean Carroll S.J., Di-
rector of KBI, told me that the number of people coming to the border has ta-
pered off, in part because of Mexico’s southern border plan with Mexican state 
officials running stricter checkpoints and police activities in origin countries, 
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like Honduras, that make it more difficult for children to escape. The Mexican 
southern border plan could not be implemented without U.S. funding. The cu-
mulative effect is “the externalization of the U.S. border.”1 
As an Australian, this experience made me consider my own country’s 
history of externalizing its border.2 Australia, an island-nation continent, is a 
nation state first founded on Aboriginal dispossession that has become a very 
multi-cultural society.3 Since World War II, it is a nation re-founded on migra-
tion from every country on earth.4 Australia has a generous, ordered, and well-
policed immigration policy.5 Australia has been particularly generous receiv-
ing refugees fleeing conflicts across the globe.6 Refugees come to Australia on 
business or tourist visas and then claim asylum upon arrival in Australia.7 
Some refugees arrive by boat, uninvited and unscreened.8 Australian govern-
ments of both political persuasions (the conservative Liberal Party and the so-
cial democratic Labor Party) have expressed a strong preference for the 
maintenance of an orderly migration program of all types of refugees, includ-
ing the reception of an annual quota of refugees chosen from abroad, usually in 
consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
HCR).9 At the same time, ever since the first boatloads of Vietnamese asylum 
seekers arrived in Darwin in 1976, the Australian government, regardless of 
political party, has had a strong commitment to stopping illegal entry of refu-
gees into the country while maintaining programs for the resettlement of prov-
en refugees.10 Furthermore, the Australian public tends to reward political par-
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ties that can deliver on the election pledge to stop refugees entering the country 
illegally.11 
When last at Boston College ten years ago, I worked on the second edi-
tion of my book Tampering with Asylum.12 That book and my advocacy made a 
modest contribution, along with the efforts of many others, to convince the 
newly elected Labor government under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd to wind 
back the so-called “Pacific Solution” instituted by the Howard Government in 
2001, as boatloads of asylum seekers started arriving in Australian territorial 
waters from Indonesia.13 This time these refugees did not originate in South-
east Asia but came mainly from faraway Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.14 They 
had not fled Indonesia fearing persecution but had continued their global jour-
ney towards Australia seeking protection, recognition as refugees, and a new 
life.15 In 2008, the reforms instituted by the Rudd government resulted in refu-
gees arriving by boat in numbers not previously experienced.16 These results 
proved that commentators like myself were wrong. In Tampering with Asylum, 
I provided a checklist of legal and policy reforms—most of which were enact-
ed by the Rudd government.17 I wrote: “There is no reason to think that our 
onshore caseload will increase exponentially given the improved regional ar-
rangements, the virtual offshore border and the tighter controls within Austral-
ian territory.”18 During seven years of the Rudd and Gillard Labor govern-
ments, over 50,000 asylum seekers arrived by boat.19 There were at least 1100 
lives lost at sea.20 By the time the Rudd government was voted out of office, 
government intelligence sources advised that the number could rise to 60,000 
per annum.21 For a country of nearly 23,000,000 people with an annual migra-
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tion intake of 190,000 for skilled migrants and family reunion purposes and an 
additional 13,750 places available for humanitarian cases, this was a projected 
arrival rate which would skew the composition of the migration program very 
significantly—removing all prospect of offering places to offshore refugees or 
other persons in desperate humanitarian need.22 At its most generous, Australia 
recently has provided 20,000 humanitarian places per year.23 
Still, several organizations have called for increased acceptances due to 
the increased flow of refugees.24 Community groups supportive of refugees 
have asked the government to “increase the annual humanitarian intake to a 
minimum of 25,000, or no less than 15 per cent [sic] of the annual migration 
intake, whichever is higher.”25 In 2012, an expert panel on asylum seekers rec-
ommended that Australia increase its humanitarian intake to 27,000 places per 
annum by 2017.26 There is a modest Community Proposal Project in place al-
lowing community groups to sponsor up to 500 refugees per year who would 
not otherwise be chosen to come to Australia.27 But 500 places are then de-
ducted from the existing annual refugee quota, and the visa fees are prohibitive 
for the most recently arrived refugee groups.28 
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 27 See AUSTL. GOV’T, COMMUNITY PROPOSAL PILOT 1 (2015). 
 28 See id. at 2. The 2015 fee schedule set a base fee of AUD 2680 per applicant and a second 
installment of AUD 16,444 for the primary applicant and AUD 2680 for each secondary applicant. 
See Fees and Charges for Visas, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROT., http://
www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa/Fees [https://perma.cc/67DH-SUU6] (scroll to “Current visa pricing 
table,” select “other,” select “Humanitarian program applications,” and scroll to “Refugee and Hu-
manitarian visa applications made under the Community Proposal Pilot in the offshore component of 
the Humanitarian Program”). 
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The current government has cut the humanitarian caseload from 20,000 
places to a mean 13,750 places.29 This provides for a minimum of 11,000 plac-
es offshore (including up to 1000 places for women at risk).30 In 2014 and 
2015, a full 4400 of these places went to Syrian and Iraqi refugees.31 There are 
over 70,000 processed applications for these 11,000 places.32 Most of these 
places are for refugees, but there are some places for persons in special human-
itarian need who can be sponsored by community members.33 The remaining 
allocation is for onshore asylum seekers who entered Australia on a visa and 
then successfully claimed refugee status.34 Those asylum seekers arriving 
without a visa are eligible only for a temporary protection visa should they 
establish their refugee claim.35 There are more than 30,000 onshore asylum 
seekers without visas who arrived by boat during the years of the Labor gov-
ernment whose applications for onshore refugee status are still to be pro-
cessed.36 Clearly, Australia and other countries around the world are faced with 
the dilemma of receiving more refugees on their border than they are prepared 
to handle.37 
On World Refugee Day, June 20, 2014, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) reported “that the number of refugees, asylum-seekers 
and internally displaced people worldwide has, for the first time in the post-
World War II era, exceeded 50 million people.”38 At the end of 2013, 
51,200,000 people were forcibly displaced, an increase of more than 6,000,000 
from the previous year.39 In 2014, the number of applications for asylum in 44 
industrialized countries increased by 45% to 866,000 from the previous year.40 
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Haven Enterprise Visa, which requires them to move to a rural area for work. See AUSTL. GOV’T 
DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROT., SAFE HAVEN ENTERPRISE VISAS 2, 3 (2015). In time they 
might be eligible for a permanent visa. See id. 
 36 Australian Parliament Backs Migrant Reforms, supra note 35. 
 37 See Patrick Boehler & Sergio Peçanha, The Global Refugee Crisis, Region by Region, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-
mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.html [https://perma.cc/WK6X-NSG2]. 
 38 UNHCR, WORLD REFUGEE DAY: GLOBAL FORCED DISPLACEMENT TOPS 50 MILLION FOR 
FIRST TIME IN POST-WORLD WAR II ERA, (June 20, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html 
[https://perma.cc/G27D-HG7Y] [hereinafter UNHCR, WORLD REFUGEE DAY]. 
 39 Id. 
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It was the second-highest number of annual applications on record.41 During 
2014, over 218,000 people seeking asylum crossed the Mediterranean Sea to 
access Europe, which almost triplicates the previous record high of approxi-
mately 70,000 during the 2011 “Arab Spring.”42 The United States received 
121,200 asylum claims, an increase of 44% on the previous year.43 
What is to be done when asylum seekers come knocking on our doors in 
such numbers? Is there a right of entry? If not, what is our obligation to the 
asylum seeker presenting to officials of our governments whether at our em-
bassies, on the high seas, within our territorial waters, or on our shores? Are 
we entitled to stipulate a gradation of obligation depending on where an asy-
lum seeker presents? Are we entitled to set up an antechamber with an offshore 
entry door at some considerable distance from our border? Those of us who 
live in prosperous, secure countries that receive migrants need to answer these 
questions: Who has a right to enter my country? What are the preconditions for 
my government being able to decently and fairly deny a right of entry to 
someone seeking entry to my country? 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER AND REFUGEES 
The international legal order has provided states with an ability to deal 
with refugees at their borders.44 Most of the world’s population is made up of 
citizens of a nation state. It is the nation state that primarily has the duty to pro-
tect our human rights. The governments of many nation states have voluntarily 
ratified an increasing raft of international human rights instruments, which in 
part limit the untrammelled sovereignty of the nation state, providing a frame-
work for enhanced protection of the human rights of all persons within its ju-
risdiction.45 An international legal order which accords ongoing recognition to 
national sovereignty is sustainable only if there is an international legal regime 
ensuring the protection of the human rights of refugees—those whose rights 
are most flagrantly violated by the government of their own nation state and 
likely cannot expect any protection from their own government.46 At the very 
least, the quid pro quo for national sovereignty and the security of national 
borders is the international community’s commitment to protect those who are 
refugees—those who have fled their home country fearing persecution and 
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abuse of their human rights by their own government.47 Nation states are enti-
tled to secure their borders, but they must not expel their own nationals nor 
deny their own nationals entry to their country.48 But what are the moral and 
legal considerations when it comes to those who are not nationals seeking ad-
mission, especially those seeking asylum? Does the asylum seeker have a right 
to enter? If not, what is the duty of the nation state to the asylum seeker pre-
senting at the border? 
Joseph Carens, professor of political science at the University of Toronto, 
has been a lifetime scholar on the ethics of immigration.49 In 2013, he pub-
lished a book with that very title, The Ethics of Immigration, concluding that 
“the conventional view that states are morally entitled to exercise discretionary 
control over immigration” is wrong.50 He argues that “our deepest moral prin-
ciples require a commitment to open borders (with modest qualifications) in a 
world where inequality between states is much reduced.”51 He thinks that our 
inherited citizenship in rich states, like the United States, his home country of 
Canada, and my home country, Australia, functions as “a form of illegitimate 
privilege.”52 He believes his ideal would not wreak the havoc you might imag-
ine because greater equality between states would provide less incentive for 
people to leave the state where they grew up and established their roots.53 But 
absent that equality, what is to be done? 
Carens expresses the fear that “there is now . . . a deep conflict between 
what morality requires of democratic states with respect to the admission of 
refugees and what democratic states and their existing populations see as their 
interests.”54 He concedes that the principle of non-refoulement might create 
disproportionate burdens for rich democratic states, all of which design sys-
tems for excluding unwelcome applicants.55 But he rightly insists that this is 
only a potential problem, not a real one.56 He notes, “[R]efugees might reason-
ably say to themselves that if they have to start life over somewhere new it 
would be better to do so in a place with more long-term opportunities for 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Id. at 241–43. 
 48 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 49 See JOSEPH H CARENS, THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION, at ix (2013); POLITICAL SCI., UNIV. OF 
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themselves and especially for their children.”57 He continues, “Many refugees 
would not have the resources to act upon this sort of calculation, but the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement creates incentives for refugees to seek asylum in a 
rich democratic state rather than somewhere else.”58 If rich democratic states 
were to have an open border policy, no doubt this principle would become a 
problem.59 There is no prospect of any politician who advocates an open bor-
der policy being elected in any of these countries.60 There is no prospect of the 
congress or parliament in any of these countries legislating for open borders.61 
Given that the rich democratic states will provide only a limited number of 
spaces for refugees outside their jurisdiction and given that the limited number 
of spaces will only ever be a miniscule percentage of those who are bona fide 
refugees in our troubled world, how should those lucky persons in the lottery 
of resettlement in a rich democratic country be chosen? Carens speaks of “the 
moral wrong involved in the use of techniques of exclusion to keep the num-
bers within bounds,” describing “[v]isa controls, carrier sanctions, and the oth-
er techniques of exclusion” as “indiscriminate mechanisms.”62 His main sug-
gestion for such democratic countries avoiding the need for the use of these 
morally questionable techniques is to break the link between claim and place, 
noting: 
People have incentives to seek asylum in places where they will be 
better off economically than they were at home, regardless of the 
strength of their refugee claims. If there were no connection be-
tween the place where one requests asylum and the place where one 
receives protection, however, these incentives would disappear. 63 
Of late, Australian governments have experimented with this approach, 
denying asylum seekers arriving by boat any prospect of resettlement in Aus-
tralia, but offering them, on proof of refugee status, resettlement in less desira-
ble countries like Nauru and Papua New Guinea.64 Most community leaders 
and advocates regard these experiments as costly, inhumane failures.65 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. (emphasis added). 
 59 See id. 
 60 See id. at 223–24.  
 61 Frank Brennan, The Politics of Popular Evil and Untrendy Truth, EUREKA STREET (Aug. 31, 
2015), http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?aeid=45413#.VjGLFq6rQdU [https://perma.cc/
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 63 Id. at 216 (citation omitted). 
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 65 See id. at 5–8. 
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Hiroshi Motomura, the author of Americans in Waiting, has recently pub-
lished the book Immigration Outside the Law.66 In part, he is investigating how 
we might extend the rule of law to immigration and border protection, apply-
ing the rule of law at the border, inside the border, and after the border cross-
ing.67 To what extent are our governments justified in excluding the rule of law 
other than the minimal agreed international safeguards beyond the border? 
And what are those safeguards? Motomura’s main focus is not on asylum 
seekers outside or at the border but on the 15,000,000 long-term residents in-
side the U.S. border who are noncitizens without lawful status.68 He espouses 
“a nation with borders, but also a nation committed to a sense of equality and 
human dignity,” where “humanitarian obligations recognized by international 
conventions can override immigration violations.”69 These ideals have rele-
vance to government behavior outside the border as well as inside and at the 
border.70 Admittedly, the rule of law is more readily applied or invoked when 
those seeking it already have strong links to the citizenry or a legitimate expec-
tation that they soon will be citizens.71 
II. REFUGEES AND THE POINT OF ENTRY 
How can international law help us mitigate the problem of human rights 
abuse when nation states, like Australia and the United States, are considering 
how to deal with asylum seekers whether beyond our borders or when present-
ing at our borders? Mine, I hope, is a principled and pragmatic approach. 
Before delving into my views, I invite you to imagine the scene on Satur-
day, July 20, 2013. I had been out of reach in Myanmar for a week. On the 
previous afternoon, the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced his 
Papua New Guinea Solution to the increased flow of boat people heading to 
Australia seeking asylum.72 He declared that all boat people headed for Aus-
tralia would be moved to Papua New Guinea for processing and ultimate reset-
tlement with the guarantee that they would never reach Australia.73 Landing in 
Sydney, my first telephone conversation was with Paris Aristotle, a refugee 
advocate who has been an adviser to Australian governments of all political 
persuasions. Knowing that I was a friend of Rudd, Paris said to me, “Frank, 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, at ix (2014). 
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 71 See id. at 87–89. 
 72 See Frank Brennan, PNG Move Proves Australia Is Not Special, EUREKA STREET (July 19, 
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you are never to leave the country again without permission.” Afterward, I 
spent a few hours writing a critical assessment of the government’s proposal, 
publishing it immediately on the internet.74 I then boarded another plane and 
flew to Brisbane for a social event at the Prime Minister’s home. Being ush-
ered into the Prime Ministerial study, I was able to say that I had already pub-
lished my view on the new policy. Rudd and I, being friends, agreed that we 
had our distinctive tasks and duties to perform. 
Ever since, I have continued asking, “What are the ethical and legal pre-
conditions for Australia being able to turn back the boats?”75 Prime Minister 
Rudd issued a challenge to all refugee advocates and social justice groups 
when he appeared on national television in the lead up to the last Australian 
election, saying: 
 The challenge that I put out to anyone who asks that we should 
consider a different approach is this: what would you do to stop 
thousands of people, including children, drowning offshore, other 
than undertake a policy direction like this? What is the alternative 
answer? 
 . . . . 
 I think you heard a people smuggler interviewed by a media out-
let the other day say that this was a fundamental assault on their 
business model. Well, that’s a pretty gruesome way for him to put 
that, but the bottom line is this, I challenge anyone else looking at 
this policy challenge for Australia to deliver a credible alternative 
policy.76 
There is much confusion about the ethical and legal considerations that 
apply when asylum seekers show up at the borders of developed countries. For 
example, in what, if any, circumstances does or ought an asylum seeker have 
the right to enter a country not her own in order to seek protection? To be 
blunt, no asylum seeker should be refouled or sent back to the country where 
they claim to face persecution unless their claim has been assessed and found 
wanting; while waiting, no asylum seeker has a right to enter any particular 
country.77 In the event that asylum seekers unlawfully gain access to a country, 
they should not be penalized for such an unlawful entry or presence provided 
only that they came in direct flight from the alleged persecution. All lawyers 
would agree with these blunt propositions. Some, especially those schooled in 
international law, would go further. They would point not just to a country’s 
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ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which guarantees the rights of 
refugees.78 They would claim that those countries that have ratified the Con-
vention against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights cannot refoule an asylum seeker until there has been a determination of 
any claim that they face torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment in their home country.79 Some of these lawyers would then take 
the next leap in human rights protection to assert that all persons have a right 
to enter any state of their choice provided only they claim to face the risk of 
persecution, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
back home.80 They translate the right not to be refouled into a right of entry to 
any state unless and until the state determines that there is no real risk of any 
of these adverse outcomes either back home or in a transit country.81 Either the 
state is able to determine all such claims at the border or else the state must 
grant entry at least for the purpose of a complete human rights assessment.82 
Much to the consternation of some refugee advocates, the Australian 
Government continues to claim that while international law recognizes the le-
gal right of people at risk of persecution to flee their country and seek refuge 
elsewhere, it does not provide them with a right to enter or remain in the terri-
tory of a country of which they are not a national.83 Further, it does not grant 
people at risk of persecution the right to choose their preferred country of pro-
tection.84 
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Australian governments (of both political persuasions, Labor and Liberal) 
have long held the defensible view: 
 The condition that refugees must be “coming directly” from a ter-
ritory where they are threatened with persecution constitutes a real 
limit on the obligation of States to exempt illegal entrants from pen-
alty. 
 In the Australian Government’s view, a person in respect of whom 
Australia owes protection will fall outside the scope of Article 31(1) 
if he or she spent more than a short period of time in a third country 
whilst travelling between the country of persecution and Australia, 
and settled there in safety or was otherwise accorded protection, or 
there was no good reason why they could not have sought and ob-
tained protection there.85 
The right to seek and enjoy asylum in the international instruments must 
be understood as purely permissive. As noted by Justice Gummow of the Aus-
tralian High Court: 
[The] right “to seek” asylum [in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights] was not accompanied by any assurance that the quest 
would be successful. A deliberate choice was made not to make a 
significant innovation in international law which would have 
amounted to a limitation upon the absolute right of member States to 
regulate immigration by conferring privileges upon individuals. . . . 
Nor was the matter taken any further by the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”). . . . Article 12 of the 
ICCPR stipulates freedom to leave any country and forbids arbitrary 
deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country; but the ICCPR 
does not provide for any right of entry to seek asylum and the omis-
sion was deliberate.86 
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Nation states that have signed these international instruments rightly are 
obliged not to expel peremptorily those persons arriving on their shores, legal-
ly or illegally, in direct flight from persecution.87 That is the limit of the legal 
obligation.88 In the future, there may be circumstances in which Australia 
would be entitled to return safely to Indonesia persons who, when departing 
Indonesia for Australia, were no longer in direct flight but rather were engaged 
in secondary movement to seek a more favorable refugee status outcome or a 
more benign migration outcome.89 We Australians could credibly draw this 
distinction if we co-operated more closely with Indonesia in providing basic 
protection and fair processing for asylum seekers there. Until we do that, there 
is no way of decently stopping refugees seeking the best status. 
The United States has attempted numerous mechanisms.90 Thirty-three 
years ago, U.S. President Ronald Reagan, frustrated by the flow of asylum 
seekers across the sea from Haiti, signed Executive Order 12324 on the “Inter-
diction of Illegal Aliens.”91 President Reagan characterized “the continuing 
illegal migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented aliens into the 
southeastern United States” as “a serious national problem detrimental to the 
interests of the United States.”92 
Guy Goodwin-Gill, the Oxford don and guru of international jurispru-
dence on refugee issues, has opined that the United States’ position became 
“the model, perhaps, for all that has followed.”93 I think he is right. Following 
the military coup in Haiti in 1991, repatriations were suspended for 7 weeks.94 
Then in May 1992, “President [George H.W.] Bush decided to continue inter-
diction and repatriation, but without the possibility of screening-in for those 
who might qualify as refugees.”95 When inaugurated as President in January 
1993, Bill Clinton maintained the interdiction practice, putting paid to the 
claim that this was just the initiative of the Republicans.96 It turned out that 
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both major political parties were committed to doing whatever it took to stop 
the boats.97 
The U.S. Supreme Court described the matter thus: 
 With both the facilities at Guantanamo and available Coast Guard 
cutters saturated, and with the number of Haitian emigrants in un-
seaworthy craft increasing (many had drowned as they attempted the 
trip to Florida), the Government could no longer both protect our 
borders and offer the Haitians even a modified screening process. It 
had to choose between allowing Haitians into the United States for 
the screening process and repatriating them without giving them any 
opportunity to establish their qualifications as refugees. In the judg-
ment of the President’s advisers, the first choice not only would 
have defeated the original purpose of the program (controlling ille-
gal immigration), but also would have impeded diplomatic efforts to 
restore democratic government in Haiti and would have posed a life-
threatening danger to thousands of persons embarking on long voy-
ages in dangerous craft. The second choice would have advanced 
those policies but deprived the fleeing Haitians of any screening 
process at a time when a significant minority of them were being 
screened in. 
 On May 23, 1992, President Bush adopted the second choice. Af-
ter assuming office, President Clinton decided not to modify that or-
der; it remains in effect today. The wisdom of the policy choices 
made by Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton is not a matter for 
our consideration.98 
It took months of concerted promotion from human rights advocates to 
convince President Clinton to institute refugee status determination interviews 
on board ships.99 In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that these harsh presidential practices were valid. Justice Stevens 
delivered the opinion of the Court majority: 
The President has directed the Coast Guard to intercept vessels ille-
gally transporting passengers from Haiti to the United States and to 
return those passengers to Haiti without first determining whether 
they may qualify as refugees. The question presented in this case is 
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whether such forced repatriation, “authorized to be undertaken only 
beyond the territorial sea of the United States,” violates . . . the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952. We hold that neither [the 
Act] nor Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees applies to action taken by the Coast Guard on the 
high seas.100 
In relation to Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, the Supreme Court 
said: 
The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the Protocol . . . 
may not have contemplated that any nation would gather fleeing 
refugees and return them to the one country they had desperately 
sought to escape; such actions may even violate the spirit of Article 
33; but a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial obli-
gations on those who ratify it through no more than its general hu-
manitarian intent. Because the text of Article 33 cannot reasonably 
be read to say anything at all about a nation’s actions toward aliens 
outside its own territory, it does not prohibit such actions.101 
In an uncharacteristic mode for the usually isolationist U.S. justices, the 
Supreme Court quoted many international law scholars in the footnotes in sup-
port of this proposition, including Goodwin-Gill.102 Goodwin-Gill wrote, “A 
categorical refusal of disembarkation cannot be equated with breach of the 
principle of non-refoulement, even though it may result in serious consequenc-
es for asylum-seekers.”103 They also quoted the respected A. Grahl-Madsen, 
who previously worked as an in-house lawyer for UNHCR for many years.104 
The Court quotes him:  
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[Non-refoulement] may only be invoked in respect of persons who 
are already present--lawfully or unlawfully--[sic]in the territory of a 
Contracting State. Article 33 only prohibits the expulsion or return 
(refoulement) of refugees to territories where they are likely to suf-
fer persecution; it does not obligate the Contracting State to admit 
any person who has not already set foot on their respective territo-
ries.105 
Goodwin-Gill has often pointed out that the Refugee Convention has a 
number of distinct features: “[A]s an international text, it must be interpreted 
in accordance with the general principles of international law . . . . [I]t is ‘a 
living instrument’, to be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions . . . . 
[and it is] ‘marked by the absence of an in-built monitoring system.’”106 This 
helps explain why refugee advocates often speak of government policies being 
contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Refugee Convention.107 That spirit 
is often enlivened by creative dialogue between UNHCR and the academy. In 
recent writings, Goodwin-Gill has been more critical of those who bluntly es-
pouse that an asylum seeker has no right of entry to a state of his or her choice 
when in flight from persecution.108 In his remarks to the 2012 American Socie-
ty of International Law Conference entitled International Norm-Making on 
Forced Displacement: Challenges and Complexity, he said: 
Although some 148 states are now party to the 1951 Convention 
and/or the 1967 Protocol, there is no single body with the compe-
tence to pronounce with authority on the meaning of words, let 
alone their application in widely and wildly differentiated and 
evolving fact situations. In the first instance, it is therefore for each 
state party to implement its international obligations in good faith 
and, in its practice and through its courts and tribunals, to determine 
the meaning and scope of those obligations.109 
He added: 
Interpreting the 1951 Convention presents the challenge of reconcil-
ing a “living instrument” with consistency with international law. A 
good-faith interpretation of the treaty is called for, which reflects, if 
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not the unknown intent of the drafters, then its object and purpose 
and the practice of states and their consent to be bound.110 
Three decades since the Haitian crisis began, Australia is confronted with 
the same situation and its political parties are firmly committed to stopping the 
boats. Following up on some Australian controversy about whether boat people 
had a right to enter Australia seeking protection, Goodwin-Gill published a 
spirited editorial in the International Journal of Refugee Law, stating: 
 The persistent illusion of an absolute, exclusionary competence is 
still a matter of concern, however, because it tends to frame and di-
rect national legislation and policies in ways that are inimical to in-
ternational cooperation and, not infrequently, contemptuous of hu-
man rights. This persistence is all the more surprising, given what 
international law has achieved and what international organization 
has done to resolve or mitigate humanitarian problems. . . . 
 The history is important, and no international lawyer can avoid 
being an historian. This gives us the long view essential to under-
standing law in the relations of states, and enables us to counter 
misunderstandings dressed up as advocacy—to point out, for exam-
ple, that no one in the Commission on Human Rights in 1947–48 
ever suggested that a right ‘to be granted asylum’ (even if it were 
adopted, which it was not) meant that you could just turn up any-
where by boat and demand and get it. What history tells us, though, 
is that the French were not without reason to argue that a right to 
seek asylum would mean little if not linked to a right to be granted 
asylum. Equally, it shows that other states spoke for their time when 
responding that this was out of sync with contemporary international 
law, at least on the narrow, immigration issue of entry and residence. 
History, then and now, reminds us of the range of legal and practical 
matters which were left open, and which have since had to be re-
solved consistently with the general principles of the Declaration at 
large. 
 It does not follow, either logically or as a matter of fact, that be-
cause states declined to declare a right to be granted asylum in 1948, 
the individual in flight and at risk of persecution or other relevant 
harm necessarily has ‘no right’ to enter state territory at any time. 
The issue is often one of ‘framing’, [sic] for everything depends on 
context, and the question for international lawyers (and for govern-
ments, legislators, critics and commentators) is when and in the light 
of what obligations might circumstances requiring entry prevail. 
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 . . . . 
 . . . Factual scenarios are hugely diverse (which accounts for the 
difficulty of harmonising refugee decision making across jurisdic-
tions), but it can never be excluded that the state may well be re-
quired, as a matter of obligation, to allow an individual to enter its 
territory for the purpose of protection. To imagine that this is 
equivalent to granting asylum, as that is understood in the practice 
of states, is to miss the whole picture – one which is rich in its com-
plexity, demanding more than the simple intonation of words like 
‘admission’, ‘entry’, ‘right’, ‘no right’, without reference to protec-
tion and to context and meaning in international law.111 
In March 2014, Goodwin-Gill followed up with an even more spirited at-
tack on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Sale decision: 
 Nor do I think that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sale 
counts for anything juridically [sic] significant, other than within the 
regrettably non-interactive legal system of the United States. Here, 
the Court ruled for domestic purposes on the construction of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. What it said on the meaning of the 
treaty was merely dictum and the Court was not competent –in at 
least two senses – to rule on international law. 
 At best, the judgment might constitute an element of State prac-
tice, but even here its international relevance can be heavily dis-
counted. The Court failed, among others, to have regard to the bind-
ing unilateral statements made by the US [sic] when interdiction was 
first introduced, and the ten years of consistent practice which fol-
lowed. And as any student of international law will tell you, practice 
and statements of this nature are highly relevant, particularly when 
against interest. 
 UNHCR, moreover, which is responsible for supervising the ap-
plication of the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol, protested the 
judgment at the time and has consistently maintained the position 
set out in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court (and in earlier inter-
ventions with the US authorities). Significantly, no other State party 
to the treaties has objected to UNHCR’s position, though the forum 
and the opportunity are readily available, such as the UNHCR Ex-
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ecutive Committee, ECOSOC, or the Third Committee of the UN 
General Assembly.112 
Be all this as it may, Goodwin-Gill nonetheless concedes in his most re-
cent writing that “[t]he 1951 Convention does not deal with the question of 
admission, and neither does it oblige a state of refuge to accord asylum as such 
. . . .”113 Goodwin-Gill’s co-author Professor Jane McAdam, when explaining 
the extra-territorial effect of international obligations and the need for Australi-
an personnel on the high seas to be attentive to the protection needs of asylum 
seekers before refusing them access to Australian territory, claimed: 
 Only the United States has said that the Refugee Convention 
doesn’t have that extra-territorial application and that’s the basis on 
which the U.S. justifies its interdiction and expulsion of Haitians 
and Cubans for instance. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld that view 
but . . . , to borrow Guy Goodwin-Gill’s language, the U.S. Supreme 
Court was not competent, in two senses of the word, to rule on the 
international law obligations of the United States, and in any sense, 
they were really interpreting a domestic statute. UNHCR . . . at the 
time and subsequently has spoken out very strongly that the U.S. in-
terpretation is wrong as a matter of international law, and not one 
country has ever contradicted UNHCR. In international law terms, 
that is a very strong tacit acceptance that UNHCR’s position is cor-
rect and that the U.S. is out there on a limb.114 
I am ad idem with Goodwin-Gill when he makes the following two ob-
servations: 
 A State which intercepts a boat carrying refugees on the high sees 
[sic] and which returns them directly to their country of origin vio-
lates the principle. Equally, an intercepting State which disembarks 
refugees and asylum seekers in a country which it knows or reason-
ably expects will refoule them, or otherwise violate their fundamen-
tal human rights, becomes party to that act.115 
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I respectfully part company with his bold generalized assertion that “non-
refoulement is precisely the sort of obligation which is engaged by extraterrito-
rial action . . . .”116 That is not my understanding of the jurisprudence of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.117 Nor is it my understanding of the jurisprudence of the 
House of Lords nor the High Court of Australia. In fact, the House of Lords 
specifically rejected these arguments in relation to non-refoulement and extra-
territoriality in 2005.118 
I am a strong critic, and always have been, of Australian measures—
including long-term detention, offshore processing (like those practiced in Na-
uru and Papua New Guinea), and chequebook solutions to resettlement (like 
the proposed Cambodia solution). Since 2013, knowing there is strong biparti-
san support for a return to Pacific-Solution type options in the Australian Par-
liament, I have wanted to investigate if ever it might be possible to turn back 
boats to Indonesia decently, fairly, and legally.  
The highly respected international lawyers Goodwin-Gill and Jane 
McAdam seem to be answering, “No, it could NEVER be legal.”119 If that be 
so, it is not an option, and we will be left with non-transparent returns (which 
suit both Australia and Indonesia) and punitive, deterrent measures post-entry 
to Australia and in places like Nauru and Papua New Guinea.  
III. A REASON TO RECONSIDER SOLIDIFIED JURISPRUDENCE:  
AUSTRALIA’S SITUATION 
Indonesia is a signatory to the ICCPR and U.N. Convention Against Tor-
ture (CAT), and it makes regular reports to the requisite UN bodies.120 In 2008, 
the Committee Against Torture wanted assurances in Indonesian domestic law 
that refoulement would never be able to occur, but there was no evidence in the 
report about any particular case or alleged violation.121 In August 2013, UN-
HCR published its concluding observations on Indonesia.122 This detailed re-
port made no mention of any concerns relating to refoulement — either under 
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ICCPR or CAT.123 Thus, the following question arises: Given that Indonesia 
signed the CAT and ICCPR, complies with the reporting provisions of CAT 
and ICCPR, and is not likely to sign the Refugee Convention; and given that 
there are no confirmed reports of Indonesia’s wrongly refouling persons re-
turned from Australia, could the conditions ever be fulfilled which would war-
rant Australia’s returning asylum seekers to Indonesia provided only that Aus-
tralia is satisfied that the asylum seekers are not in direct flight from persecu-
tion in Indonesia, and further provided that Australia is satisfied that the re-
turnees will not face the real risk of torture or cruel or degrading treatment in 
Indonesia? 
It is the height of legal formalism to posit that one could never entertain 
the notion of setting preconditions for such returns (such as UNHCR super-
vised processing, accommodation and services administered by the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration, etc.) only because Indonesia is not a signa-
tory to the Refugee Convention.124 It is one thing to have credible evidence of 
wrongful refoulement from Indonesia prior to determination of claims, but it is 
another to rule out ab initio the possibility of safe returns to Indonesia. If you 
do the latter, how could you ever even be satisfied that Indonesia’s accession to 
the Refugee Convention would ever justify returns? The reductio ad absurdum 
of Goodwin-Gill’s position is that Australia could never return anyone to Indo-
nesia regardless of what instruments it had signed and regardless of what in-
ternational reporting it had undertaken.125 
Many Australian debates now come down to advocates alleging that Aus-
tralian policy is contrary to the spirit of the Refugee Convention, while the 
government responds that its policy is consistent with the letter of the Conven-
tion.126 Compliance with the letter does not make a policy right or decent. 
There is often a need for more robust moral argument and also more finely 
honed constitutional and statutory construction arguments to counter what is 
being proposed. 
Whatever is made of U.S. exceptionalism in international law, the ap-
proach of the United States, in fact, has given license and a paradigm during 
the last two decades to other rich nations worried about an influx of boat peo-
ple.127 Australian governments of both political persuasions have adopted the 
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, and to date, the Australian High 
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Court has not begged to differ.128 In 2005, the House of Lords indicated its 
agreement with the U.S. Supreme Court decision and reasoning about Article 
33.129 In Regina (European Roma Rights Centre) v. Immigration Officer at 
Prague Airport, the House of Lords had been asked to rule that the U.S. deci-
sion was wrong.130 The House of Lords declined.131 Their Lordships, having 
surveyed the history of the 1951 Convention and later attempts to amend or re-
interpret it, stated categorically that the non-refoulement provision related only 
to persons within the territory of a state.132 They considered all the arguments 
for expansion of the non-refoulement principle to go beyond the frontier of the 
nation state.133 Goodwin-Gill appeared as counsel for UNHCR, arguing that 
the principle of non-refoulement is a rule of customary international law that 
co-exists with a state's treaty obligations, such as Article 33 of the Refugees 
Convention, which prohibits states from returning refugees to territories where 
they risk persecution, torture, or death and requires states not to reject refugees 
at the border of their country of nationality where they fear persecution.134   
UNHCR’s argument was rejected by the House of Lords. In the lead 
judgment in the House of Lords, Lord Bingham stated: 
In 1967 the United Nations adopted a Declaration on Territorial 
Asylum which provided, in article 3, that no person entitled to in-
voke article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
should be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier, but 
a conference held in 1977 to embody this and other provisions in a 
revised convention ended in failure. As Justice Gummow J [of the 
Australian High Court] put it in Ibrahim . . . , in his judgment given 
in October 2000, “there have been attempts which it is unnecessary 
to recount here to broaden the scope of the Convention itself by a 
Draft United Nations Convention on Territorial Asylum but these 
collapsed more than twenty years ago.”135 
Lord Bingham concluded the discussion about the submission urging the 
court to expand the principle of non-refoulement to persons at the frontier and 
outside the territory of the nation state signatory to the Convention: 
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In considering whether the rule contended for has received the as-
sent of the nations, it is pertinent to recall that the states parties to 
the 1951 Convention have not, despite much international discus-
sion, agreed to revise its terms or extend its scope at any time since 
1967. None of the citations [put in support of the proposition] is 
from a legislative instrument. The House was referred to no judicial 
decision supporting the rule contended for and a number of recent 
decisions (Sale in the United States, Ibrahim and Khawar in Austral-
ia) are inimical to it. Have the states in practice observed such a 
rule? It seems to me clear that they have not.136 
Whereas other law lords said they simply agreed with Lord Bingham on 
the asylum issues raised, Lord Hope of Craighead dealt with the questions 
himself and was even more forthright. He said: 
I do not, with respect, think that the Sale case was wrongly decided. 
The issue in that case was not as to what was or was not fair. The 
majority recognised the moral weight of the argument that a nation 
should be prevented from repatriating refugees to their potential op-
pressors whether or not the refugees were within that nation’s bor-
ders. But in their opinion both the text and the negotiating history of 
article 33 affirmatively indicated that it was not intended to have ex-
traterritorial effect. Judicial support for this view is found in the 
opinion of Gummow J [of the Australian High Court] in Applicant A 
v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) and in the oth-
er authorities which Lord Bingham has referred to.137 
One wonders what is the point of the UNHCR putting submissions to the 
High Court of Australia as they did in October 2014, proposing that “the 
weight of opinion at international law is that the principle of non-refoulement, 
including under Art 33(1) of the Refugee Convention applies, wherever a State 
exercises jurisdiction, and whether it is exercised de jure or de facto.”138 In 
addition, the UNHCR claimed that it was “only aware of one superior court 
decision that is inconsistent with this understanding, being the decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Sale.”139 The UNHCR submission was misleading and 
unhelpful, especially given that the UNHCR was an intervener in the House of 
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Lords case.140 Both the Australian High Court and the House of Lords histori-
cally have  followed the U.S. Supreme Court in Sale or at least assumed it is 
correct.141 For its part, the Australian Human Rights Commission submitted to 
the High Court “that the construction given to Article 33(1) by the majority of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc, [sic] is incor-
rect.”142 In the recent decision of CPCF v. Minister for Immigration and Bor-
der Protection, the High Court of Australia did not cast any adverse imputa-
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tions on the relevant U.S. and UK decisions.143 In this case, the High Court 
found no grounds for invalidating the Australian government’s holding of 157 
Tamil asylum seekers on an Australian vessel on the high seas in the Indian 
Ocean for a month while Australia attempted to negotiate their return to India 
from whence they had set sail.144 The Chief Justice, referring to the U.S. and 
UK decisions, said, “The defendants argued that the non-refoulement obliga-
tion under the Refugees Convention only applied to receiving States in respect 
of refugees within their territories. There is support for that view in some deci-
sions of this Court, the House of Lords and the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”145 Justice Keane, referring to those decisions, said, “Judicial authority 
in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America suggests 
that a state’s obligations under the Convention arise only with respect to per-
sons who are within that state’s territory.”146 He went on to say:  
Under the Migration Act, the protection obligations imposed on the 
Executive government are afforded to non-citizens who are within 
Australian territory. The authorities suggest that this limitation is 
consistent with the circumstance that the protection obligations im-
posed by the Convention concern rights to be afforded to persons 
within the territory of Contracting States.147 
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a more human-
rights-friendly approach to the reception of asylum seekers.148 Perhaps in the 
future, the Australian High Court might be convinced to follow more jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights rather than the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the UK House of Lords, at least when interpreting Australian stat-
utes which are arguably consistent with the fulfillment of Australia’s interna-
tional treaty obligations. But this would require the High Court to abandon 
some of its own earlier jurisprudence as well as the House of Lords’ unequivo-
cal endorsement of the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach.149 What makes this 
most unlikely is that the Australian parliament is legislating exhaustive provi-
sions that are dismissive of international law.150 In the absence of any Australi-
an bill of rights or Human Rights Act, the High Court of Australia is then con-
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strained to interpret the unambiguous Australian statutory provisions regard-
less of the letter or spirit of international instruments and law.151 As Justice 
Keane said in the recent case: 
Australian courts are bound to apply Australian statute law “even if 
that law should violate a rule of international law.” International law 
does not form part of Australian law until it has been enacted in leg-
islation. In construing an Australian statute, our courts will read 
“general words . . . subject to the established rules of international 
law” unless a contrary intention appears from the statute. In this 
case, there is no occasion to invoke this principle of statutory con-
struction. The terms of the Act are specific. They leave no doubt as 
to its operation.152 
All seven judges of the High Court basically took this approach.153 The 
Australian parliament has been so specific in codifying the law of asylum at 
the frontier that there is nothing for the judges to do except to apply the letter 
of the law—regardless of the general principles of international law.154 You 
may just as well be quoting the Catechism of the Catholic Church to them as 
submit the learned opinions of international lawyers. 
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTERPRETATION 
In Europe, the focus has been on boats coming across the Mediterranean 
Sea and through the Balkans.155 The European Court of Human Rights became 
apprised of EU practices in the Mediterranean in the 2012 case Hirsi v. Italy.156 
The applicants in that case were eleven Somali nationals and thirteen Eritrean 
nationals who “were part of a group of about two hundred individuals who left 
Libya aboard three vessels with the aim of reaching the Italian coast.”157 Three 
vessels from the Italian Revenue Police and Coast Guard intercepted the boats 
on May 6, 2009, when the vessels were thirty-five nautical miles south of 
Lampedusa.158 Italian authorities transferred occupants of the boats onto Italian 
military ships and returned them to Tripoli.159 After arriving in Tripoli, the mi-
grants were handed over to the Libyan authorities.160 The applicants claim that 
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“they objected to being handed over to the Libyan authorities but were forced 
to leave the Italian ships.”161 The Italian Minister of the Interior, at a press con-
ference on May 7, 2009, stated that the operation to intercept the vessels and 
return the migrants to Libya was the consequence of bilateral agreements with 
Libya that entered into force on February 4, 2009.162 He also stated that the 
agreements represented a critical turning point in the fight against clandestine 
immigration.163 
The applicants complained that their return to Libya had forced them to 
be subject to the risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in Libya 
and in their respective countries of origin.164 The migrants based their com-
plaint on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which pro-
vides: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.”165 
The Court found: 
 The Court has already had occasion to note that the States which 
form the external borders of the European Union are currently expe-
riencing considerable difficulties in coping with the increasing in-
flux of migrants and asylum-seekers. It does not underestimate the 
burden and pressure this situation places on the States concerned, 
which are all the greater in the present context of economic crisis. It 
is particularly aware of the difficulties related to the phenomenon of 
migration by sea, involving for States additional complications in 
controlling the borders in southern Europe.  
 However, having regard to the absolute character of the rights se-
cured by Article 3, that cannot absolve a State of its obligations un-
der that provision.  
 The Court reiterates that protection against the treatment prohibit-
ed by Article 3 imposes on States the obligation not to remove any 
person who, in the receiving country, would run the real risk of be-
ing subjected to such treatment.166 
The Court ruled unanimously that the applicants were within the jurisdic-
tion of Italy for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention; that there had 
been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention based on the applicants’ expo-
sure to the risk of ill treatment in Libya; and that the risk of the applicants’ be-
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ing returned to Somalia and Eritrea constituted a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention.167 
When Lord Neuberger, the Chief Justice of the United Kingdom, visited 
Australia in 2014, he took the opportunity to express some forthright views 
about the European Court of Human Rights.168 He told the justices of the Vic-
torian Supreme Court: 
I think we may sometimes have been too ready to treat Strasbourg 
court decisions as if they were determinations by a UK court whose 
decisions were binding on us. It is a civilian court under enormous 
pressure, which sits in chambers far more often than in banc [sic], 
and whose judgments are often initially prepared by staffers, and 
who have produced a number of inconsistent decisions over the 
years. I think that we are beginning to see that the traditional com-
mon law approach may not be appropriate, at least to the extent that 
we should be more ready not to follow Strasbourg chamber deci-
sions.169 
But in the end, he came down in favor of the general approach of the Eu-
ropean Court, conceding that the United Kingdom’s ratification of the Conven-
tion and the passage of its own Human Rights Act resulted in the courts being 
“pitchforked into ruling on the most contentious issues of the day,” including 
asylum seekers’ rights.170 He observed: 
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The fact that “unelected” judges, especially foreign judges, are per-
ceived to have been given powers which they previously had not en-
joyed, coupled with the distaste in some political quarters for all 
things European, and the media’s concentration on prisoners’ votes 
and asylum seekers, has rendered the Convention something of a 
whipping boy for some politicians and newspapers. This appears to 
many people to be unfortunate. There are decisions of the Stras-
bourg court with which one can reasonably disagree, indeed with 
which I disagree. This is scarcely surprising; indeed, it would be 
astonishing if it were otherwise. However, to my mind, there are 
very few of its decisions which can fairly be said to be miscon-
ceived.171 
Compared to the EU, Australia does not have a Human Rights Act, and it 
is not accountable to any outside judicial body like Strasbourg.172 This may 
help to account for Australia’s less-nuanced approach to stopping the boats.173 
In Australia, the Executive finds itself freer from judicial constraint. Mind you, 
the Australian High Court flexes its muscles from time to time. In September 
2014, the court unanimously struck down the government’s attempt to avoid 
giving permanent protection visas to asylum seekers proven to be refugees 
who also pass the requisite health and security checks.174 But since then, the 
Parliament has legislated to provide only temporary protection visas.175 
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Presently, Australia is quite sterile ground for international lawyers agitat-
ing the rights of asylum seekers. Not only has the High Court made clear that 
there is little room for the application of international law when interpreting 
tight statutory provisions aimed at enhancing border protection, but also the 
Australian Parliament has now legislated a string of new statutory provisions 
specifying that:  
The exercise of various border protection powers is not invalid: 
(a) because of a failure to consider Australia’s international obliga-
tions, or the international obligations or domestic law of any other 
country; or 
(b) because of a defective consideration of Australia’s international 
obligations, or the international obligations or domestic law of any 
other country; or 
(c) because the exercise of the power is inconsistent with Australia’s 
international obligations.176 
The Australian Executive has displayed its frustration with an internation-
al law approach as enunciated by UN agencies: when Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott responded to criticisms by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Juan 
Méndez, who had expressed criticisms of Australia’s offshore asylum ar-
rangements, he admitted that he had not visited the facilities.177 The Rappor-
teur tabled a series of broad, sweeping findings against Australia in relation to 
torture et al. at the UN Human Rights Council. For example in relation to one 
complaint, Méndez wrote: 
In the absence of information to the contrary, the Rapporteur con-
cludes that there is substance in the allegations presented in the ini-
tial communication, reiterated above, and thus, that the Government 
of Australia, by failing to provide adequate detention conditions; end 
the practice of detention of children; and put a stop to the escalating 
violence and tension at the Regional Processing Centre, has violated 
the right of the asylum seekers, including children, to be free from 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as provided by ar-
ticles 1 and 16 of the CAT.178 
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Suggestions to the UN Human Rights Council that a government is tortur-
ing children do need more than the repetition of hearsay allegations. According 
to The Sydney Morning Herald, Prime Minister Abbott replied: 
 I really think Australians are sick of being lectured to by the Unit-
ed Nations, particularly, particularly given that we have stopped the 
boats, and by stopping the boats, we have ended the deaths at 
sea. . . . 
 The most humanitarian, the most decent, the most compassionate 
thing you can do is stop these boats because hundreds, we think 
about 1200 in fact, drowned at sea during the flourishing of the peo-
ple smuggling trade under the former government. 
 . . . . 
 I think the UN’s representatives would have a lot more credibility 
if they were to give some credit to the Australian government for 
what we’ve been able to achieve in this area.179 
On the issue of border protection and asylum, it has reached the stage in 
Australia that government and the Parliament are attempting to lock out all 
influence by international law.180 
V. RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE TOWARDS REFUGEES 
Having offered some observations about the present cul-de-sac confront-
ing international lawyers concerned about Australia’s behavior at the border, I 
now turn to the effects of religious discourse and other moral urgings in the 
public square, convinced that such discourse often can augment, consolidate, 
and extend the protection of the human rights of those whose interests do not 
coincide with those of the majority in a nation state. 
As a Jesuit and a lawyer, permit me to be so bold as to suggest that the 
public moral argument posited on religious conviction and domestic judicial 
review are two necessary, additional devices for reining in the executive gov-
ernment responding to populist sentiment to secure the borders and stop the 
boats. It is the judicial method which permits fine consideration of the claims 
of those who present at our borders, helping to counter the more broad stroke 
governmental decisions to punish those who present at our borders in order to 
send a message to other intending asylum seekers and to give a preference to 
those asylum seekers chosen by government rather than those who self-select 
by presenting themselves at the border. It is the moral argument (whether reli-
gious or not), which augments the secular liberal approach within the nation 
state. The secular liberal finds it hard to formulate an argument for universal 
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care extending beyond the injunction for government to care for their own citi-
zens by maintaining the security of their borders. At the very least, the secular 
liberal should concede the assistance, which might be obtained from the reli-
gious practitioners who profess the dignity of all human persons, and not just 
those holding passports for nation states living in peace and with economic 
security. 
Marking the 60th anniversary of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, 
the late and revered Seamus Heaney wrote: 
Since it was framed, the Declaration has succeeded in creating an in-
ternational moral consensus. It is always there as a means of high-
lighting abuse if not always as a remedy: it exists instead in the 
moral imagination as an equivalent of the gold standard in the 
monetary system. The articulation of its tenets has made them into 
world currency of a negotiable sort. Even if its Articles are ignored 
or flouted—in many cases by governments who have signed up to 
them—it provides a worldwide amplification system for “the still, 
small voice”.181 
Religious leaders have a capacity to contribute to the amplification of the 
still, small voice, just as international lawyers do—so too do poets, folk sing-
ers, and novelists. The concept of human rights has real work to do whenever 
those with power justify their solutions to social ills or political conflicts only 
on the basis of majority support or by claiming the solutions will lead to an 
improved situation for the mainstream majority. Even if a particular solution is 
popular or maximizes gains for the greatest number of people, it might still be 
wrong and objectionable. There is a need to regard the wellbeing of all mem-
bers of the human community, and not just those within the preferred purview 
of government consideration. 
Lampedusa, Italy continues to be a beacon for asylum seekers fleeing 
desperate situations in Africa seeking admission into the EU.182 Lampedusa is 
a lightning rod for European concerns about the security of borders in an in-
creasingly globalized world where people as well as capital flow across porous 
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borders.183 That is why Pope Francis went there on his first official papal visit 
outside Rome.184 At Lampedusa on July 8, 2013, he said: 
“Where is your brother?” Who is responsible for this blood? In 
Spanish literature we have a comedy of Lope de Vega which tells 
how the people of the town of Fuente Ovejuna kill their governor 
because he is a tyrant. They do it in such a way that no one knows 
who the actual killer is. So when the royal judge asks: “Who killed 
the governor?”, they all reply: “Fuente Ovejuna, sir”. Everybody 
and nobody! Today too, the question has to be asked: Who is re-
sponsible for the blood of these brothers and sisters of ours? No-
body! That is our answer: It isn’t me; I don’t have anything to do 
with it; it must be someone else, but certainly not me. Yet God is 
asking each of us: “Where is the blood of your brother which cries 
out to me?” Today no one in our world feels responsible; we have 
lost a sense of responsibility for our brothers and sisters. We have 
fallen into the hypocrisy of the priest and the levite whom Jesus de-
scribed in the parable of the Good Samaritan: we see our brother 
half dead on the side of the road, and perhaps we say to ourselves: 
“poor soul . . . !”, and then go on our way. It’s not our responsibility, 
and with that we feel reassured, assuaged. The culture of comfort, 
which makes us think only of ourselves, makes us insensitive to the 
cries of other people, makes us live in soap bubbles which, however 
lovely, are insubstantial; they offer a fleeting and empty illusion 
which results in indifference to others; indeed, it even leads to the 
globalization of indifference. In this globalized world, we have fall-
en into globalized indifference. We have become used to the suffer-
ing of others: it doesn’t affect me; it doesn’t concern me; it’s none of 
my business! Here we can think of Manzoni’s character – “the Un-
named.” The globalization of indifference makes us all “unnamed,” 
responsible, yet nameless and faceless.185 
VI. APPLYING RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE TO POLICY 
It is all very well for the Pope to say these things. But who is listening? 
And even if they are listening, who is taking notice? Should it extend beyond 
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Catholicism? The Pope’s intervention, as well as the innate moral sense of the 
Italian community that there had to be a more decent way of dealing with pro-
spective migrants drowning in the Mediterranean, contributed to the Italian 
Government’s decision to establish the Mare Nostrum operation.186 
Recently in Australia, two of our greatly admired ex-prime ministers from 
opposite sides of the political fence have died.187 They were Gough Whitlam 
and Malcolm Fraser.188 Whitlam was prime minister at the end of the Vietnam 
War, and Fraser succeeded him in 1975.189 Each was concerned by the prospect 
of large numbers of Vietnamese refugees arriving in Australia by boat without 
visas.190 Their political parties were committed equally to stopping the boats. 
Initially with the fall of South Vietnam, Australian politicians and civil serv-
ants were very wary about receiving large numbers of refugees from Vi-
etnam.191 In 1976, a joint parliamentary committee unanimously concluded 
that, prior to the evacuation of the Australian embassy in Saigon in 1975, there 
was “deliberate delay in order to minimise the number of refugees with which 
Australia would have to concern itself.”192 Politicians from both sides of the 
aisle stated, “As unpalatable as it may be, we are forced to conclude that the 
[Whitlam] Government acted reluctantly and, as expressed by one witness, in 
order to placate an increasingly suspicious Australian public.”193 
As prime minister, Fraser gave great leadership in the Australian commu-
nity, cultivating public acceptance of the idea that Australia would play its part 
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in receiving a significant number of Vietnamese refugees chosen by Australian 
government officials from camps in other Southeast Asian countries like Thai-
land.194 Eventually, an orderly departure program was negotiated with the Vi-
etnamese government.195 On both sides of the political aisle in Australia, there 
were concerns expressed about “queue jumpers” and those falsely claiming to 
be refugees while seeking a better life.196 Both Whitlam and Fraser, like all 
their political successors, expressed concerns about boat people arriving with-
out visas and without prior selection by Australian officials.197 In May 1977, 
Fraser’s Minister for Immigration, Michael MacKellar, set out Australia’s first 
comprehensive refugee policy, insisting: “The decision to accept refugees- 
must always remain with the Government of Australia.”198 He announced,  
There will be a regular intake of Indo-Chinese refugees from Thailand 
and nearby areas at a level consistent with our capacity as a communi-
ty to resettle them. In this operation, we shall be relying greatly on the 
co-operation of the UNHCR, other Governments, especially the Thai 
Government, and voluntary agencies in Australia.199 
A year later, there was an increasing flow of refugees out of Vietnam and 
into camps around Southeast Asia.200 The Fraser government insisted on the 
need for a co-operative international approach.201 When non-governmental 
agencies started to provide assistance to boat people on the high seas, MacKel-
lar told Parliament: “I put the proposition that the people concerned with the 
project could not see a situation emerging where Australia would automatically 
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allow the entry of any people that such a vessel happened to pick up.”202 On 
June 29, 1978, the Labor Party’s spokesman on immigration, Dr. Moss Cass, 
wrote a very inflammatory opinion piece in The Australian lamenting the arri-
val of over 1000 boat people in Darwin Harbour, none of whom had been sent 
back to Vietnam.203 He said, “The implications of a government policy which 
accepts queue-jumping on this scale are obvious.”204 He was adamant that 
“those refugees seeking residence in Australia who jump the queue by arriving 
on our shores without proper authorisation should not be given resident status, 
even temporarily.”205 On August 15, 1978, the Labor frontbencher, Clyde 
Cameron, who had been Whitlam’s Immigration Minister, asked Prime Minis-
ter Fraser a rather hostile and insinuating question: “Will he tell the Parliament 
what approaches were made by the United States of America which were in 
any way responsible for the decision to permit Vietnamese nationals to enter 
Australia without permits?”206 Fraser answered: 
 The United States of America has not attempted to influence pro-
cedures for entry to Australia.  
 The Australian Government will at all times decide the require-
ments for entry to Australia.  
 No Vietnamese nationals are permitted to enter Australia without 
entry permits. The 1634 boat refugees who have arrived in Darwin 
without prior authority were issued with temporary entry permits on 
arrival pending consideration of their applications to remain here.207 
The major political parties agreed on the need to arrest the flow of boats, 
while being generous with the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees, who then 
came through the camps in Southeast Asia under what later became the com-
prehensive plan of action in 1989.208 On March 16, 1982, Ian MacPhee, Fra-
ser’s next Immigration Minister after MacKellar, provided Parliament with an 
update on the government’s refugee policy, stating, “The decision to accept 
refugees must always remain with the Australian Government.”209 He told Par-
liament: 
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During my visit last year I reached the conclusion, commonly held 
by many involved in both the Indo-Chinese and Eastern European 
refugee situations, that a proportion of people now leaving their 
homelands were doing so to seek a better way of life rather than to 
escape from some form of persecution. In other words their motiva-
tion is the same as over one million others who apply annually to 
migrate to Australia. To accept them as refugees would in effect 
condone queue-jumping as migrants.210 
He called for a “balance between compassion and realism.”211 He an-
nounced progress with an orderly departure program aimed at arresting the 
flow of boats out of Vietnam.212 He reached agreement with his counterparts in 
Thailand and Malaysia on how to arrest the flow and how to handle the num-
bers coming through.213 All this humanitarian effort was posited on the prem-
ise of stopping the boats from coming uninvited to Australia.214 
There was a very moving scene at the recent state funeral of Malcolm 
Fraser when Vietnamese Australians thronged outside the church carrying 
placards, one of which read: “Farewell to our true champion of humanity[:] 
Malcolm Fraser.”215 I honor Fraser, but not because he opened our borders to 
fleeing boat people coming in numbers in the tens of thousands. He didn’t. He 
secured the borders, and then, as novelist Tim Winton put it, he led the nation 
in opening “our arms and hearts to tens of thousands” of refugees.216 Winton is 
wrong to claim that Fraser welcomed the boats. Rather, Winton is right to pro-
claim: 
I was proud of my country, then, proud of the man who made it hap-
pen, Malcolm Fraser, whose greatness shames those who’ve fol-
lowed him in the job. Those were the days when a leader drew the 
people up and asked the best of them and despite their misgivings, 
Australians rose to the challenge. And I want to honour his memory 
today.217 
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By seeking the right balance between compassion and realism, between 
the human rights of asylum seekers and the national interest of a rich demo-
cratic country, we might find as much guidance from the memory of the last 
generation of refugees in their honoring of the last generation of political lead-
ers who tried to forge a politically acceptable solution that was both compas-
sionate and fair to the many who were seeking asylum. In a country like Aus-
tralia, I have concluded that stopping the boats is a precondition to finding a 
politically acceptable, compassionate, and fair solution. The boats will be 
stopped. But they need to be stopped decently and fairly so that the Australian 
community might then be more generous in opening the doors to a higher quo-
ta of refugees and funding the international agencies and other governments 
caring for asylum seekers in transit. As one of the richest, most democratic 
countries in Southeast Asia, Australia will always be an attractive destination 
for some of the 51,000,000 displaced persons in our world.218 
Mary Ellen O’Connell concludes her book, The Power and Purpose of In-
ternational Law, with the observation: 
International law needs improvement, however, not demolition, be-
cause it remains the single, generally accepted means to solve the 
world’s problems. These problems will not be solved by armed con-
flict or the imposition of a single ideology or religion. Through in-
ternational law diverse cultures can reach consensus about the moral 
norms that we should commonly live by. People everywhere believe 
in law, believe in this alternative to force, as they believe in higher 
things. They want the power of law to be used to achieve the com-
munity’s most important common goals. International law reflects 
that the international community’s shared goals today are peace, re-
spect for human rights, prosperity, and the protection of the natural 
environment.219 
VII. THE CONTINUED NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
International law, statesmanship, moral leadership by civil society, and 
the churches can all contribute to developing consensus about the moral norms 
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that we should commonly live by. At the same time, it is important to secure 
our national borders while being responsive to our obligations to those less 
fortunate than us just because they find themselves on the wrong side of our 
borders plagued by persecution. I return to Australia accepting that my politi-
cal leaders will always maintain a commitment to stopping the boats, no matter 
what political party they represent; but I return insisting that there is a need for 
international cooperation to determine how decently to stop the boats while 
providing an enhanced commitment to the orderly transfer of an increased 
number of refugees across our border so that they might live safe and fulfilling 
lives contributing to the life of the nation. 
This cannot be done in Australia until we shut down the processing cen-
ters on Nauru and on Manus Island and accept that people should only be held 
in detention while issues of identity, security, and health are determined. We 
must negotiate arrangements with Indonesia, India, and any other transit coun-
tries to which asylum seekers are being returned, and replicate the new Euro-
pean regulation: 
No person shall, in contravention of the principle of non-
refoulement, be disembarked in, forced to enter, conducted to or 
otherwise handed over to the authorities of a country where, inter 
alia, there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the 
death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, 
sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or politi-
cal opinion, or from which there is a serious risk of an expulsion, 
removal or extradition to another country in contravention of the 
principle of non-refoulement.220 
It might then be possible for Australian officials to conduct prompt, relia-
ble onboard assessments of asylum seekers on vessels to determine whether it 
is appropriate to return them to their last port of call, even without the need for 
an onboard international lawyer to conduct any sort of  “framing” exercise.221 
It should then be possible to avoid the recent obscene scenario of 157 persons 
being detained on the high seas for a month, regardless of whether or not the 
non-refoulement obligation applies extra-territorially.222 
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International law has its place in helping to change the policy settings of 
governments and to redirect the public debate. No doubt the Hirsi decision 
helped contribute to the development of thinking in Europe culminating in re-
cent regulation for dealing with boat people coming across the Mediterrane-
an.223 It remains to be seen how effective Frontex Operation Triton is both at 
dissuading people from setting out on boats in the first place and then rescuing 
them when they do.224 With 280,000 people having entered the EU illegally in 
2014, it is no surprise that the EU is now experimenting with its own external-
ized border, seeking to have Niger, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey pre-
screen intending migrants.225 The United Kingdom continues to be agnostic 
about the utility of proactive interception and rescue missions on the Mediter-
ranean.226 When Operation Triton was being established, Baroness Anelay, the 
Minister of State, Foreign, and Commonwealth Office, told the House of Lords: 
We do not support planned search and rescue operations in the Med-
iterranean. We believe that they create an unintended “pull factor”, 
encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing 
and thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths. The 
Government believes the most effective way to prevent refugees and 
migrants attempting this dangerous crossing is to focus our attention 
on countries of origin and transit, as well as taking steps to fight the 
people smugglers who wilfully [sic] put lives at risk by packing mi-
grants into unseaworthy boats.227 
The Spanish Parliament legislated to allow “hot returns” of irregular mi-
grants at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa in order to 
prevent illegal immigration into Spain, and Spanish border police and Moroc-
can forces guard the borders of these enclaves.228 Stefan Kessler, the Europe 
Senior Policy Officer for the Jesuit Refugee Service, said, “There is the con-
crete danger that persons will be physically prevented from reaching the border 
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crossing points and therefore will be blocked from lodging a protection 
claim.”229 
When considering the mission of international lawyers trying to humanize 
these externalized borders, Martii Koskenniemi’s prescient remarks come to 
mind: 
International law increasingly appears as that which resists being re-
duced to a technique of governance. When international lawyers are 
interviewed on the Iraqi war, or on torture, or on trade and environ-
ment, on poverty and disease in Africa—as they increasingly are—
they are not expected to engage in hair-splitting technical analyses. 
Instead, they are called upon to soothe anxious souls, to give voice 
to frustration and outrage. Moral pathos and religion frequently fail 
as vocabularies of engagement, providers of ‘empty signifiers’ for 
expressing commitment and solidarity. Foreign policy may connote 
party rule. This is why international law may often appear as the on-
ly available surface over which managerial governance may be chal-
lenged, the sole vocabulary with a horizon of transcendence—even 
if, or perhaps precisely because, that horizon is not easily translated 
into another institutional project. I often think of international law as 
a kind of secular faith.230 
None of us would want more realistic and more decent options in these 
most toxic of times to be forfeited simply because there is a new emerging 
fundamentalism being preached by the most respected high priests of interna-
tional law. It is time to concede that none of us has a right to enter another 
country and that all of us have the obligation not to return anyone presenting at 
our border to a situation of persecution, torture, or cruel punishment. Though I 
doubt the possibility that the EU would negotiate appropriate returns of asylum 
seekers to Libya in the foreseeable future, I continue to entertain the hope that 
Australia can negotiate appropriate returns to transit several countries—such as 
Indonesia for Iraqis, Afghans, and Iranians and India for Tamils—so that Aus-
tralia might then decently extend the hand of welcome to more of the world’s 
51,000,000 displaced persons. 
CONCLUSION 
For the moment, my country is failing to strike the right balance between 
human rights and the national interest. It is stopping the boats indecently, vio-
lating the human dignity of those being held in unsatisfactory conditions in 
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Papua New Guinea and on Nauru, and failing to ensure appropriate safeguards 
are in place for the return of asylum seekers to Indonesia. For as long as inter-
national lawyers claim that there is no possibility of a legally negotiated, re-
gional agreement for safe returns (they argue that asylum seekers have a right 
of entry to Australia to seek asylum), the Australian government, the Australian 
Parliament, and the Australian courts will maintain, with impunity but with the 
occasional expression of outrage from international lawyers, a regime of re-
turns insufficiently scrutinized for human rights compliance. I return to Aus-
tralia accepting that the boats will continue to be stopped (no matter which 
political party is in power) but that they should be stopped decently and in 
compliance with the legal regime enunciated by the European Union. After all, 
such regime has to deal with a far more pressing issue but more searching su-
pervision of the European Court of Human Rights and of the European Parlia-
ment, which has greater sensitivity to the human rights of asylum seekers than 
do their more pragmatic Australian colleagues. 
By all means, stop the boats. But also close the facilities on Nauru and in 
Papua New Guinea. Abandon the Cambodian shipment plan. Negotiate a re-
gional agreement for safe returns ensuring compliance with the non-
refoulement obligation. Double the refugee and humanitarian component from 
13,750 places to 27,000 places in the migration program, as recommended by 
the 2012 Expert Panel.231 Encourage further community participation in a ref-
ugee resettlement scheme that allows refugee communities and their supporters 
to increase the number of refugees resettled without taking the places of those 
refugees who would come anyway without community sponsorship. Why not 
increase the humanitarian program to at least the 20,000 places, which were 
guaranteed prior to the election of the Abbott Government? And provide an-
other 7,000 places for community-sponsored refugees. 
I agree with novelist Tim Winton that there is a need for countries like 
Australia to turn back, to “[r]aise us back up to our best selves.”232 That can 
best be done by securing our borders and increasing our commitment to order-
ly resettlement of more refugees, rather than opening the borders and under-
mining the community’s commitment to further assisting more refugees who 
are suffering displacement. 
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